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This paper investigates the effect of resale allowance on entry strategies in a second
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acterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies. We then show that there
exists a unique threshold such that if the reseller’s bargaining power is greater (less)
than the threshold, resale allowance causes the leading bidder (the following bidder) to
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the impact of resale opportunities on bidders’ entry behavior
in a sealed bid second price auction with sequential and costly participation. Under the
independent private value environment, each bidder sequentially arrives at the auction and
knows her private value before making the entry decision. The bidder upon arrival can
observe the entry history in the auction, and then decide whether or not to enter. If she
does so, an unavoidable participation cost needs to be incurred. In this circumstance, it is
well known that a deterrence effect exists in the auction, which means that a bidder who
has observed the information of the previous participation will have less incentive to incur
the cost to enter. Due to this effect, the auction outcome would mis-assign the object to the
low-valuation bidder, creating a possibility for resale after the auction.
In reality, resale can be conducted in different formats, such as bargaining, re-auction,
and posted price. In this paper, we follow Gupta and Lebrun (1999) and Pagnozzi (2007)
to assume that after the initial auction stage, bidders’ valuations become commonly known
and the resale stage is conducted in a standard Nash bargaining game.1 Under this model
setting, the resale opportunity creates a tradeoff for bidders: on the one hand, bidders would
prefer to directly attend the resale market to avoid the participation cost in the auction; on
the other hand, resale allowance would also encourage bidders to enter the auction, because
the possibility of reselling the object to the other bidders may generate a higher expected
payoff. Our interest is to examine how the resale allowance will affect entry strategies of
bidders in such an auction.
In this paper, after introducing a resale stage in the auction game, we first characterize
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies, where each bidder enters and bids
truthfully if and only if her private valuation is no less than a cutoff. Second, by comparing
the absence and the presence of resale in the auction, there exists a unique threshold such
that if the reseller’s bargaining power is greater than the threshold, the expected payoff from
resale dominates the benefit of avoiding the entry cost for the leading bidder, causing her to
become more aggressive on participating in the auction; i.e., her equilibrium cutoff of entry
becomes lower. However, if this bargaining power is less than the threshold, our comparison
shows that the cutoff of entry for the following bidder becomes higher, implying that she has
a lower incentive to enter after resale is allowed.2
1See Zheng (2002), Haile (2003), and Hafalir and Krishna (2008) for resale with incomplete information.
2This result corresponds only to the cutoffs when entry is possible for both bidders. However, if the
leading bidder’s private value is lower than the cutoff of entry, we will show, in Proposition 2, that resale
allowance leads the following bidder to become more aggressive on entry, because there exists an opportunity
for the following bidder to resell the object to the leading bidder.
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We will also provide some extended discussion. First, we relax the assumption of sym-
metric bidders in the auction and show that the impact of resale allowance on the cutoffs of
entry is unaffected when the distributions of the bidders’ valuations become asymmetric. We
then comment on the change in the original seller’s expected revenue after resale is allowed.
Resale has been partially studied in the auction theory literature. Haile (2000, 2001,
2003) shows that resale may occur because bidders’ private values change after auction; in a
two-stage auction model, a bidder may win the item in the initial auction and subsequently
resell it to bidders who turn out to have high private values after auction. Even if bidders’
valuations do not change, Garratt and Tro¨ger (2006) demonstrate the possibility of resale
in auctions when a speculator with zero valuation exists. They show that, to avoid bidding
competition, bidders with real valuations choose to drop out of the auction and buy the item
from the speculator in the resale market.
Under the setting of asymmetric bidders, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) consider resale in
first and second price auctions via monopoly pricing, and conclude that a first price auction
is more profitable for the seller than a second price auction. Following a similar manner, an
extension of the resale stage to a dynamic bargaining game is investigated by Cheng (2011),
who shows that the opposite ranking in a seller’s expected revenue will be achieved when
this more general type of bargaining is considered.
Additionally, Zheng (2002) and Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2009) identify the conditions
under which the optimal auction, as characterized by Myerson (1981), can be achieved via
resale. Lebrun (2012) proves that after resale is permitted, the optimal allocation can still
be achieved through an English auction with a special class of asymmetric n bidders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the equilibria in
cutoff strategies in a second price auction with and without resale, and examines the effect
of resale allowance on bidders’ cutoff strategies. In Section 3, we provide some extended
discussion as remarks. Section 4 concludes this study.
2 The Setup
Consider a seller selling a single indivisible object by employing a second price auction.
There are two risk-neutral potential bidders indexed by i = 1 or 2. Each bidder in turn
decides whether or not to enter and place a bid. Prior to making the entry decision, each
bidder knows her private value vi, which is randomly drawn over [0, 1] according to an
accumulative distribution F (.) and f(.) ≡ F ′(.). When entry is taken, a cost is incurred,
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denoted by c ∈ (0, 1). This entry cost c is the same across the two potential bidders.3
We further assume that bidder 1 is the leading bidder and bidder 2 is the following bidder.
First, the leading bidder makes a decision regarding whether or not to enter. If she decides
to enter and place a bid, she has to pay c; otherwise, she leaves the auction. In the following
bidder’s turn, she observes the leading bidder’s decision, and then decides whether or not
to pay c to participate in the auction. If a bidder decides to leave, she cannot revisit the
auction. The seller’s valuation of the object is zero and a reserve price cannot be set.
Obviously, it is not always a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder to place her true
value when there exist a participation cost and sequential arrival of bidders in the auction.
However, given other bidders bidding truthfully, conditional on entry, a bidder cannot do
better than placing her true value. We therefore restrict our attention to the equilibrium
where bidders use cutoff strategies; bidder i enters and bids truthfully if and only if her
private valuation is no less than a cutoff xi ∈ (0, 1]. All of our results should be interpreted
accordingly. Then, bidder i’s strategy, denoted by bi(vi), can be expressed as follows:
bi(vi) =
{
vi if vi ≥ xi,
No otherwise,
where “No” denotes no participation. In particular, if xi = 1, bidder i never enters the
auction, regardless of her private valuation.
2.1 Equilibrium Cutoffs of Entry without Resale
It is well known that when resale is restricted in the auction, the unique equilibrium in
cutoff strategies is characterized by4
x′1F (x
′
2) = c, (1)
and
1
1− F (x′1)
∫ x′2
x′1
(F (v)− F (x′1))dv = c, (2)
where x′1 and x
′
2 are the equilibrium cutoffs of entry for bidders 1 and 2, respectively. In
this equilibrium, bidder 1 enters if v1 ≥ x′1. Then, bidder 2, observing that bidder 1 has
3See Samuelson (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1994), Tan and Yilankaya (2006),
and Bulow and Klemperer (2009) for auctions with costly entry.
4The entry cost c should be in (0, c′), where c′ is given by c′ = 11−F (c′)
∫ 1
c′(F (v) − F (c′))dv. Tian and
Xiao (2009) provide the technical details on the proof of this equilibrium.
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entered, chooses to enter if v2 ≥ x′2. Obviously, x′1 < x′2 in the equilibrium; the participation
information of the leading bidder lowers the possibility of the following bidder’s entry. As
has been mentioned previously, this is identified as the deterrence effect in the auction. Due
to this effect, the following bidder with private value v2 ∈ [x′1, x′2) cannot enter the auction,
even if her private value is greater than the leading bidder’s (i.e., v2 > v1). This therefore
yields a possibility of resale between the two bidders.
Of course, along the equilibrium path, if bidder 2 upon arrival observes that no bid has
been placed by bidder 1 in the auction, she believes that v1 < x
′
1 and then chooses to enter
if v2 ≥ c; this cutoff of entry for bidder 2 is denoted by x′2N = c. In this case, resale would
also occur if v2 < v1. We will study both resale possibilities in the next subsection.
2.2 Equilibrium Cutoffs of Entry with Resale
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium when resale is allowed after the auc-
tion. We assume that after the auction, each bidder’s private valuation becomes common
knowledge, and resale (if possible) is conducted in a standard Nash bargaining game.5 The
bargaining power parameters of the reseller and the buyer are λ and (1 − λ), respectively,
where λ ∈ (0, 1).
Given that both bidders submit their true values conditional on entry, the only task that
remains is to characterize the equilibrium cutoffs of entry in the auction with resale. Let x∗1,
x∗2, and x
∗
2N denote the cutoffs of entry for bidder 1 and bidder 2, where x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
2N ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, when x∗1 and x
∗
2N satisfy x
∗
2N +
λ
F (x∗1)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (x∗1) − F (v))dv = c, we write this
implicit function as x∗2N(x
∗
1), and assume that
Assumption 1. x∗1F (x
∗
2N) is non-decreasing in x
∗
1.
This assumption ensures that the derivative of x∗1F (x
∗
2N) with respect to x
∗
1 is non-
negative, which is useful to prove the existence of the equilibrium in the following analysis.
Moreover, let cM be implicitly defined by cM =
λ
1−F (cM )
∫ 1
cM
(F (v)−F (cM))dv. The following
result is then guaranteed:
Proposition 1. Suppose that c ∈ (0, cM) and Assumption 1 holds. If resale is allowed in
the auction, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies, which can be
5This assumption can be easily justified by the fact that the entry cost in a resale market is relatively
smaller than in auctions, because auctions are normally conducted by formal authorities (such as auction
houses and the government), which require bidders to pass entrance examinations and qualifications for
bidding. However, a resale market would be more decentralized and organized with fewer restrictions;
normally, this type of trading only refers to bargaining between two bidders, and hence, a lower participation
cost has to be paid. For analytical convenience, we normalize this cost to be zero in the resale market.
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characterized by
F (x∗2)x
∗
1 + λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (x∗2)− F (v))dv − (1− λ)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (v)− F (x∗2N))dv = c, (3)
λ
1− F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv = c, (4)
and
x∗2N +
λ
F (x∗1)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (x∗1)− F (v))dv = c, (5)
In this equilibrium, bidder 1 chooses to enter if v1 ≥ x∗1. Upon arrival, if bidder 2 observes
a bid in the auction, she chooses to enter if v2 ≥ x∗2. If, however, there is no bid in the
auction, bidder 2 chooses to enter if v2 ≥ x∗2N . Resale occurs after the auction stage if
x∗1 ≤ v1 < v2 ≤ x∗2 or x∗2N ≤ v2 < v1 ≤ x∗1.
Proof. Before proceeding further, it is worth examining the relationship among the three
cutoffs of entry x∗1, x
∗
2, and x
∗
2N . This will help us construct the equilibrium in the following
analysis.
First of all, it is clear to see that x∗2N < x
∗
2, as bidder 2 has a higher incentive to enter,
when observing no bid in the auction. We further see that in any equilibrium, it is impossible
to have x∗2 ≤ x∗1, as bidder 2 with a private value slightly above x∗2 always has an incentive
to deviate (chooses not to enter), if she observes that a bid has been placed by bidder 1,
implying that v1 ≥ x∗1. Thus, if any equilibrium exists in the auction, the equilibrium cutoffs
should be either x∗2N < x
∗
1 < x
∗
2 or x
∗
1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2. As the first situation gives more analytical
interests than the second one, in the main text, we restrict our attention to the situation
where x∗2N < x
∗
1 < x
∗
2.
6 We solve the game by backward induction.
Case 1.1. Observing that a bid has been placed, bidder 2 knows that bidder 1 has entered
the auction, implying that v1 ≥ x∗1. Then, she has two choices: either competing with bidder
1 in the auction by paying c and placing her true value, or bargaining with bidder 1 in the
resale market. Now suppose that v2 = x
∗
2. If bidder 2 enters the auction, the expected payoff
is 1
1−F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)−F (x∗1))dv− c. If, however, bidder 2 chooses to enter the resale market,
resale will happen if and only if v1 < v2; bidder 1 as the reseller receives the surplus λ(v2−v1)
6Readers in the following analysis will see that under the equilibrium where x∗2N < x
∗
1 < x
∗
2, resale may
occur in two different situations: either bidder 2 is the reseller and bidder 1 is the buyer, or bidder 1 is the
reseller and bidder 2 is the buyer. In contrast, in the equilibrium with x∗1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2, resale only occurs
where bidder 1 is the reseller and bidder 2 is the buyer. Interested readers can see the full analysis for the
second type of equilibrium in the Appendix.
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and bidder 2 as the buyer gains (1−λ)(v2− v1). Thus, the expected payoff of bidder 2 from
the resale market is given by
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1− λ)(x∗2− v) f(v)1−F (x∗1)dv. Obviously, given that the bidders
play cutoff strategies, we know that bidder 2 with v2 = x
∗
2 should be indifferent between
the two choices, namely, 1
1−F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v) − F (x∗1))dv − c =
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1 − λ)(x∗2 − v) f(v)1−F (x∗1)dv.
Simplifying it yields equation (4).
Case 1.2. Observing that the leading bidder has not entered the auction, bidder 2 believes
that v1 < x
∗
1 and chooses to enter the auction if v2 ≥ x∗2N . Of course, resale will also occur
if x∗2N ≤ v2 < v1 < x∗1. Contrary to Case 1.1, bidder 2 will be the reseller and bidder 1 will
be the buyer. Clearly, in this case bidder 2 with value x∗2N should be indifferent between
entering and not entering, implying that x∗2N +
λ
F (x∗1)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (x∗1) − F (v))dv = c, where the
first term is the expected payoff from the auction and the second term is the expected payoff
from reselling to bidder 1. This gives equation (5).
Moving backward to bidder 1’s entry decision and assuming that v1 = x
∗
1, if bidder
1 chooses to enter the auction, the only difference when resale is allowed, in contrast to
no resale, is that there exists an opportunity for bidder 1 to sell the object to bidder 2
if she realizes v1 < v2 after the auction. Therefore, corresponding to Case 1.1, the total
payoff of bidder 1 from entry is x∗1F (x
∗
2) + λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(v − x∗1)dF (v) − c, where the first term is
the expected payoff from winning the auction and the second term is the expected payoff
from reselling the object to bidder 2. However, if bidder 1 chooses to enter the resale
market directly, which corresponds to Case 1.2, she can only obtain the object via resale
and receive the expected payoff (1 − λ) ∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (v) − F (x∗2N))dv.7 When v1 = x∗1, bidder 1
should be indifferent between entering the auction and entering the resale market, and thus,
x∗1F (x
∗
2) + λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(v − x∗1)dF (v) − c = (1 − λ)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F (v) − F (x∗2N))dv. Simplifying it gives
equation (3).8
We then prove that the cutoffs x∗1, x
∗
2, and x
∗
2N are unique in equations (3), (4), and (5)
by the following three steps.
Step 1.1. Differentiating x∗2N with respect to x
∗
1 in equation (5) shows
dx∗2N
dx∗1
< 0.
7Note that in this case, bidder 1 is the buyer and bidder 2 is the reseller.
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed this out.
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Step 1.2. Differentiating x∗2 with respect to x
∗
1 in equation (3) yields
dx∗2
dx∗1
f(x∗2)[λx
∗
2 + (1− λ)x∗1] =− (1− λ)F (x∗2)− λF (x∗1) + (1− λ)[F (x∗1)− F (x∗2N)]
− (1− λ)f(x∗2N)(x∗1 − x∗2N)
dx∗2N
dx∗1
=− (1− λ)[F (x∗2)− F (x∗1)]− λF (x∗1) + (1− λ)f(x∗2N)x∗2N
dx∗2N
dx∗1
− (1− λ)
[
F (x∗2N) + f(x
∗
2N)x
∗
1
dx∗2N
dx∗1
]
.
Since
dx∗2N
dx∗1
< 0 by Step 1.1, the first three terms are negative in the equation above, and thus
we focus on the last term. Given the fact that dx∗1F (x
∗
2N)/dx
∗
1 = F (x
∗
2N) + f(x
∗
2N)x
∗
1
dx∗2N
dx∗1
, by
Assumption 1, we know that x∗1F (x
∗
2N) is non-decreasing in x
∗
1, implying dx
∗
1F (x
∗
2N)/dx
∗
1 ≥ 0.
Therefore,
dx∗2
dx∗1
< 0.
Step 1.3. We define Ω(x∗1) ≡ λ1−F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v) − F (x∗1))dv − c. Differentiating Ω(x∗1) with
respect to x∗1 and noting
dx∗2
dx∗1
< 0 by Step 1.2, we have
dΩ
dx∗1
=
λ
1− F (x∗1)
[
(F (x∗2)− F (x∗1))
dx∗2
dx∗1
− f(x∗1)(x∗2 − x∗1)
]
+
λf(x∗1)
(1− F (x∗1))2
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv
<
−λf(x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1− F (v))dv
(1− F (x∗1))2
< 0.
If x∗1 → x∗2, lim
x∗1→x∗2
Ω(x∗1) = −c < 0. If x∗1 → c, lim
x∗1→c
Ω(x∗1) =
λ
1−F (c)
∫ x∗2
c
(F (v) − F (c))dv − c
and it is easy to check that Ω(c) > 0 if c ∈ (0, cM).9 Therefore, we can conclude that given
any c ∈ (0, cM), there exists a unique x∗1 satisfying Ω(x∗1) = 0. This also implies that x∗2N
and x∗2 are uniquely determined.
Finally, given the cutoffs x∗1, x
∗
2, and x
∗
2N characterized by the equations above, we con-
sider a strategy profile as follows. Bidder 1 upon arrival chooses to enter and to bid her
true value if v1 ≥ x∗1. When bidder 2 arrives, if she observes a bid in the auction, she knows
that bidder 1 has already entered the auction, and she chooses to enter and to bid truthfully
9Differentiating Ω(c) with respect to c shows that dΩdc < 0, and further, limc→0
Ω(c) = λ
∫ x∗2
0
F (v)dv > 0 and
lim
c→cM
Ω(c) = Ω(cM ) = 0. Thus, given any c ∈ (0, cM ), Ω(c) > 0.
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if v2 ≥ x∗2. If, however, there is no bid in the auction, bidder 2 chooses to enter and to
submit her private value if v2 ≥ x∗2N . Resale occurs after the auction in both cases: either
x∗1 ≤ v1 < v2 ≤ x∗2 or x∗2N ≤ v2 < v1 ≤ x∗1.
Obviously, bidder 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy profile,
given bidder 2’s strategy. Along the equilibrium path, given bidder 1’s strategy, it is also
optimal for bidder 2 to choose not to deviate. Thus, this strategy profile constitutes a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the auction.
2.3 Comparison of Cutoffs with and without Resale
In this subsection, we compare the cutoffs of entry for bidders 1 and 2 with and without
resale, and present the following result:
Proposition 2. Resale allowance results in x∗2N < x
′
2N , and there exists a unique threshold
λ′ such that x∗1 < x
′
1 if λ ≥ λ′ and x∗2 > x′2 if λ < λ′.
Proof. We first compare x∗2N and x
′
2N . Obviously, following from equation (5), we have
x∗2N < c = x
′
2N . In this case, resale allowance leads bidder 2 to become more aggressive on
entry, conditional on bidder 1 having not entered the auction.
Given x∗2N , we then utilize equations (3) and (4) to examine the changes in the cutoffs
of entry x∗1 and x
∗
2. For convenience, let G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) denote the left hand side
of equations (3) and (4), respectively; this allows us to rewrite equations (3) and (4) as
G(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c. Further, differentiating G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) with respect to x
∗
1 and
x∗2 yields
∂G
∂x∗1
> 0 and ∂G
∂x∗2
> 0, respectively, indicating that G(x∗1, x
∗
2) is increasing in both
arguments (i.e., x∗1 and x
∗
2). Additionally, differentiating H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) with respect to x
∗
1 and
x∗2 yields
∂H
∂x∗1
< 0 and ∂H
∂x∗2
> 0, respectively, showing that H(x∗1, x
∗
2) is decreasing in the first
argument (x∗1) but increasing in the second (x
∗
2). Given λ ∈ (0, 1) and x∗2N , substituting x′1
and x′2 into functions H and G yields H(x
′
1, x
′
2) < c, and G(x
′
1, x
′
2) ≥ (<)c if λ ≥ (<)λ′,
where λ′ satisfies that λ′
∫ x′2
x′1
(F (x′2)− F (v))dv = (1− λ′)
∫ x′1
x∗2N
(F (v)− F (x∗2N))dv.
Given the properties of functions G and H above, we prove the proposition by contra-
diction.
(I) λ ≥ λ′, implying that G(x′1, x′2) ≥ c and H(x′1, x′2) < c.
Case 2.1. If x∗1 = x
′
1, given that G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c and G(x
∗
1, x
′
2) ≥ c, then x∗2 is no greater
than x′2. However, this case would not support the equilibrium outcomes, as the fact that
H(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c and H(x
∗
1, x
′
2) < c requires that x
∗
2 > x
′
2, creating a contradiction.
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Case 2.2. If x∗1 > x
′
1 and x
∗
2 ≥ x′2, given that G(x′1, x′2) ≥ c and that G(x∗1, x∗2) is increasing
in both x∗1 and x
∗
2, then G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) > c, which contradicts the fact that G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c. If
x∗1 > x
′
1 and x
∗
2 < x
′
2, both G(x
′
1, x
′
2) ≥ c and G(x∗1, x∗2) = c can be satisfied. However,
given that H(x′1, x
′
2) < c and that H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is decreasing in x
∗
1 but increasing in x
∗
2, then
H(x∗1, x
∗
2) < c, contradictory to H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c. Thus, x
∗
1 > x
′
1 cannot be supported in the
equilibrium outcomes.
Therefore, x∗1 < x
′
1. Nevertheless, given that the leading bidder becomes more aggressive
on entry after resale is allowed, we cannot rule out all of the possibilities for the change in
the following bidder’s cutoff of entry where x∗2 T x′2.
(II) λ < λ′, implying that G(x′1, x
′
2) < c and H(x
′
1, x
′
2) < c.
Case 2.3. If x′2 = x
∗
2, given that G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c and G(x
′
1, x
∗
2) < c, then x
∗
1 is greater
than x′1. However, this case would not support the equilibrium outcomes, as the fact that
H(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c and H(x
′
1, x
∗
2) < c requires that x
′
1 > x
∗
1, creating a contradiction.
Case 2.4. If x′2 > x
∗
2 and x
′
1 ≥ x∗1, given that G(x∗1, x∗2) is increasing in both x∗1 and x∗2, then
G(x′1, x
′
2) > c, which contradicts the fact that G(x
′
1, x
′
2) < c. If x
′
2 > x
∗
2 and x
′
1 < x
∗
1, both
G(x′1, x
′
2) < c and G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c can be satisfied. However, given that H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is decreasing
in x∗1 but increasing in x
∗
2, then H(x
′
1, x
′
2) > c, contradicting H(x
′
1, x
′
2) < c. Thus, x
′
2 > x
∗
2
cannot be supported in the equilibrium outcomes.
Therefore, x′2 < x
∗
2. Nevertheless, given that the following bidder has a lower incentive
on entry after resale is allowed, we cannot rule out all of the possibilities for the change in
the leading bidder’s cutoff of entry where x∗1 T x′1.
3 Some Remarks
In this section, we provide some remarks as follows.
Asymmetric Bidders. Under the same setting but with asymmetric distributions of
the bidders’ valuations, i.e., F1(.) 6= F2(.), the equilibrium in cutoff strategies can still be
easily established. If the auction is without resale, the equilibrium outcome can be rewritten
as follows: x′1F2(x
′
2) = c and
1
1−F1(x′1)
∫ x′2
x′1
(F1(v)−F1(x′1))dv = c. In addition, the equilibrium
with resale is characterized by F2(x
∗
2)[λx
∗
2 + (1−λ)x∗1]−λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
F2(v)dv− (1−λ)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F2(v)−
F2(x
∗
2N))dv = c,
λ
1−F1(x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F1(v)−F1(x∗1))dv = c, and x∗2N+ λF1(x∗1)
∫ x∗1
x∗2N
(F1(x
∗
1)−F1(v))dv =
10
c. To ensure the existence of the equilibrium, similar to Assumption 1, we assume that
x∗1F2(x
∗
2N) is non-decreasing.
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Given the above equilibrium outcomes, it is easy to see that the setting of asymmetric
bidders does not affect the result in Proposition 2; after the resale stage is introduced, there
exists a unique threshold such that the leading bidder becomes more aggressive on entry if
the reseller’s bargaining power is greater than the threshold, whereas the following bidder’s
entry incentive becomes lower if this bargaining power is less than the threshold.11
Remark 1. The impact of resale allowance on the cutoffs of entry is unaffected if the bidders’
valuations are not identically distributed.
Expected Revenue of the Original Seller. Let Πs denote the original seller’s ex-
pected revenue in the auction. Clearly, Πs is given by Πs(k1, k2) = (1−F (k2))
∫ k2
k1
vf(v)dv+
2
∫ 1
k2
v(1− F (v))f(v)dv, where k1 = x′1 and k2 = x′2 without a resale stage, and k1 = x∗1 and
k2 = x
∗
2 with a resale stage. The first term is the expected payment when v1 is in [k1, k2]
and v2 is in [k2, 1]; the second term is the expected payment when both bidders’ valuations
are in [k2, 1]. In other cases, the expected payment for the original seller is zero.
Remark 2. Given the ambiguity of the changes in the bidders’ cutoffs of entry, the effect of
resale allowance on the original seller’s expected revenue remains unclear.
Note that we can utilize Πs(k1, k2) to compute the seller’s expected revenues in both
types of equilibria with resale.12 Thus, the unclearness of the effect of resale allowance on
the original seller’s expected revenue (i.e., Remark 2) applies in both types of equilibria.
Example. Assume that the private values are uniformly distrusted on the unit interval
(i.e., x ∈ [0, 1], F (x) = x). If c = 0.2 and λ = 0.59, it is easy to compute that no resale
yields x′1 = 0.251, x
′
2 = 0.798, and Πs(x
′
1, x
′
2) = 0.093; resale allowance gives x
∗
1 = 0.017,
x∗2 = 0.833, and Πs(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = 0.082. The seller is worse off with resale. However, if c = 0.16
and λ = 0.61, we obtain x′1 = 0.222, x
′
2 = 0.721, and Πs(x
′
1, x
′
2) = 0.129 without resale; while
we have x∗1 = 0.011, x
∗
2 = 0.731, and Πs(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = 0.131 with resale. The seller’s revenue
increases after resale is allowed.
10We also provide the equilibrium outcome with asymmetric bidders when x∗1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2 in the Appendix.
11Similarly, if the leading bidder’s private value is lower than the cutoff of entry, resale allowance will still
lead the following bidder to become more aggressive on entry.
12Πs(k1, k2) only depends on the bidders’ cutoffs when both bidders enter the auction.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how resale allowance affects the entry strategies of two bidders
who sequentially decide to participate in a second price auction. Moreover, this participation
is a costly activity for both bidders. We first characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
cutoff strategies. We then demonstrate that resale allowance increases the leading bidder’s
incentive to enter the auction if the reseller’s bargaining power is sufficiently large (i.e.,
greater than a threshold). Conversely, if this bargaining power is lower than the threshold,
the cutoff of entry for the following bidder increases.
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Appendix
The equilibrium where x∗1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2
In the following proposition, we provide the existence of the equilibrium in cutoff strate-
gies, where x∗1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2.
Proposition 3. If resale is allowed in the auction and c ∈ (0, cM), there exists a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies, which can be characterized by
F (x∗2)[λx
∗
2 + (1− λ)x∗1]− λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
F (v)dv = c, (6)
λ
1− F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv = c, (7)
and
x∗2N = c. (8)
In this equilibrium, bidder 1 chooses to enter if v1 ≥ x∗1. Upon arrival, if bidder 2 observes a
bid in the auction, she chooses to enter if v2 ≥ x∗2. If, however, there is no bid in the auction,
bidder 2 chooses to enter if v2 ≥ x∗2N = c. Resale occurs after auction if x∗1 ≤ v1 < v2 ≤ x∗2.
Proof. After resale is allowed in the auction, there are two cases when bidder 2 arrives.
Case 3.1. Observing that a bid has been placed, bidder 2 knows that bidder 1 has entered
the auction and then she has two choices: either competing with bidder 1 in the auction by
paying c and placing her true value, or bargaining with bidder 1 in the resale market. Suppose
that v2 = x
∗
2. If bidder 2 enters the auction, the expected payoff becomes
1
1−F (x1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)−
F (x1))dv − c. If, however, bidder 2 chooses to enter the resale market, resale will happen if
and only if v1 < v2; bidder 1 as the reseller shares the surplus λ(v2− v1) and bidder 2 as the
buyer gains (1−λ)(v2− v1). Thus, the expected payoff of bidder 2 from the resale market is
given by
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1−λ)(x∗2−v) f(v)1−F (x∗1)dv. Obviously, given that bidders play cutoff strategies, we
know that bidder 2 should be indifferent to both choices; these two expected payoffs should
be the same: 1
1−F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv− c =
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1− λ)(x∗2 − v) f(v)1−F (x∗1)dv. Simplifying it
yields equation (7).
Moving backward to bidder 1’s entry decision, following the same logic, when v1 = x
∗
1,
bidder 1 should be indifferent about entering the auction or not. However, in contrast to
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no resale, the only difference when resale is allowed is that there exists an opportunity for
bidder 1 to sell the object to bidder 2 if he realizes v1 < v2 after the auction. Therefore, the
total payoff of bidder 1 with v1 = x
∗
1 from entry becomes x
∗
1F (x
∗
2) + λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(v− x∗1)dF (v) = c,
where the first term is the expected payoff from winning the auction and the second term is
the expected payoff by reselling the object to bidder 2. Simplifying it gives us equation (6).
Case 3.2. Observing that the leading bidder does not enter the auction, bidder 2 believes
that v1 < x
∗
1, and hence chooses to enter the auction if v2 ≥ c. This implies that x∗2N = c.
Note that, contrary to Case 3.1, there is no resale in this case, as x∗1 ≤ x∗2N in equilibrium.
We further prove that given any c ∈ (0, cM), the cutoffs x∗1 and x∗2 are uniquely deter-
mined. Fixing any c, differentiating x∗2 with respect to x
∗
1 in equation (6) shows
dx∗2
dx∗1
< 0. We
then define Ω(x∗1) ≡ λ1−F (x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv − c. Differentiating Ω(x∗1) with respect to
x∗1 and noting
dx∗2
dx∗1
< 0, we have
dΩ
dx∗1
=
λ
1− F (x∗1)
[
(F (x∗2)− F (x∗1))
dx∗2
dx∗1
− f(x∗1)(x∗2 − x∗1)
]
+
λf(x∗1)
(1− F (x∗1))2
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F (v)− F (x∗1))dv
<
−λf(x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(1− F (v))dv
(1− F (x∗1))2
< 0.
If x∗1 → x∗2, Ω(x∗1) = −c < 0. If x∗1 → c, lim
x∗1→c
Ω(x∗1) =
λ
1−F (c)
∫ x∗2
c
(F (v)− F (c))dv − c and it is
easy to check that Ω(c) > 0.13 Therefore, we can conclude that given any c ∈ (0, cM), there
exists a unique x∗1 satisfying Ω(x
∗
1) = 0 and this also implies that x
∗
2 is uniquely determined.
Finally, given the cutoffs x∗1 and x
∗
2 characterized by the equation system, we consider a
strategy profile such that bidder 1 after arrival chooses to enter if v1 ≥ x∗1 and to leave the
auction if v1 < x
∗
1. When bidder 2 arrives, if she observes a bid in the auction, she knows
that bidder 1 has already entered the auction and chooses to enter if and only if v2 ≥ x∗2. If,
however, there is no bid in the auction, bidder 2 chooses to enter if v2 ≥ c.
Obviously, bidder 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy profile,
given bidder 2’s strategy. Along the equilibrium path, given bidder 1’s strategy, it is also
optimal for bidder 2 to choose not to deviate. Thus, this strategy profile constitutes a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the auction. In this equilibrium, resale occurs after the auction when
13Differentiating Ω(cM ) = 0 with respect to c shows
dΩ
dc < 0, and further, limc→0
Ω(c) = λ
∫ x∗2
0
F (v)dv > 0
and lim
c→cM
Ω(c) = Ω(cM ) = 0. Thus, Ω(c) > 0 given any c ∈ (0, cM ).
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x∗1 ≤ v1 < v2 ≤ x∗2.
Comparison of Cutoffs with and without Resale
We compare the cutoffs of entry for bidders 1 and 2 with and without resale, and present
the following result:
Proposition 4. If resale is allowed, then x∗2N = x
′
2N , x
∗
1 < x
′
1 but x
∗
2 may be greater than,
less than, or equal to x′2.
Proof. Obviously, x∗2N = x
′
2N ; resale allowance does not affect bidder 2’s entry decision,
conditional on bidder 1 having not entered the auction.
We then utilize equations (6) and (7) to examine the changes in the cutoffs of entry x∗1
and x∗2. For convenience, let G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) denote the left hand sides of equations
(6) and (7), respectively. This allows us to rewrite the equilibrium outcome with resale as
follows: G(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c.
Given any λ ∈ (0, 1), it is obvious that substituting x′1 and x′2 into functions G and H
yields G(x′1, x
′
2) > c and H(x
′
1, x
′
2) < c. Further, differentiating G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) with respect to x
∗
2
and H(x∗1, x
∗
2) with respect to x
∗
1 yields
∂G
∂x∗2
> 0 and ∂H
∂x∗1
< 0. Thus, we know that G(x∗1, x
∗
2)
is increasing in both arguments (i.e., x∗1 and x
∗
2), and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is decreasing in the first
argument (x∗1) but increasing in the second (x
∗
2). Given the properties of functions G and H
above, we prove this proposition by contradiction. Consider the following two cases:
Case 4.1. If x1 = x
′
1, given the fact that G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c and G(x
∗
1, x
′
2) > c, then x
∗
2 is no
greater than x′2. However, this case would not support the equilibrium, as the facts that
H(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c and H(x
∗
1, x
′
2) < c require that x
∗
2 > x
′
2. This creates a contradiction.
Case 4.2. If x∗1 > x
′
1 and x
∗
2 ≥ x′2, given that G(x′1, x′2) > c and G(x∗1, x∗2) is increasing in
both x∗1 and x
∗
2, then G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) > c, obviously showing a contradiction with the fact that
G(x∗1, x
∗
2) = c. If x
∗
1 > x
′
1 and x
∗
2 < x
′
2, both G(x
′
1, x
′
2) > c and G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c can be
satisfied. However, given that H(x′1, x
′
2) < c and H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is decreasing in x
∗
1 but increasing
in x∗2, then H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) < c, contradicting with H(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = c. Therefore, x
∗
1 > x
′
1 cannot be
supported in the equilibrium with resale.
Therefore, we can conclude that x′1 < x
∗
1. Nevertheless, given that the leading bidder
becomes more aggressive on entry after resale is allowed, the comparison of the cutoffs for
the following bidder relies on the distribution function and the bargaining power. Thus, we
cannot rule out all the possibilities where x∗2 T x′2.
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Asymmetric Bidders
If the auction is with resale, the equilibrium can be rewritten as follows:
F2(x
∗
2)[λx
∗
2 + (1− λ)x∗1]− λ
∫ x∗2
x∗1
F2(v)dv = c,
λ
1− F1(x∗1)
∫ x∗2
x∗1
(F1(v)− F1(x∗1))dv = c,
and
x∗2N = c.
Given this equilibrium outcome, it is simple to see that the setting of asymmetric bidders
does not change the result in Proposition 4. Accordingly, Remark 1 also holds for the
equilibrium where x∗1 ≤ x∗2N < x∗2.
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